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WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
PARENT AND C1m1---PARENT'S LIABTlTY FOR CInD 's NE.aL-
GENCE IN OPERATING AuTomoBM.-Plaintiff was injured through
the negligence of defendant's daughter, nineteen years of age,
while driving defendant's car for her own pleasure with defend-
ant's knowledge and consent. Held, that the father is not liable.
Blair v. Broadwater, 93 S. E. 632 (Va. 1917).
Since the common-law rule is generally recognized that a parent
is not liable for the torts of his child on the ground of the parental
relationship, Cohen v. Meador, 119 Va. 429, 89 S. E. 876 (1916),
other reasons for imposing liability upon the parent are assigned
by courts -which disagree with the principal case. One ground
sometimes relied upon by such courts is that the child is the agent
of the parent in operating the automobile even for its own pleas-
ure. Davis v. Littlefied, 97 S. C. 171, 81 S. E. 487 (1914) ; Birch
v. Abercrombie, 74 Wash. 486, 113 Pac. 1020 (1913). In other
words, they say that the father in purchasing an automobile to be
used by the family for their pleasure, has entered upon the busi-
ness of furnishing pleasure for the family, and that the child even
in carrying out its own designs in pleasure-seeking, is acting as
the father's agent and conducting the father's business thereby.
This contention is not supported by the weight of authority or of
reason, and is clearly met by the fact that the child in olerating
the car is not acting under the direction of the parent or truly in
the furtherance of the parent's business, but is, in fact, with the
parent's permission, merely carrying out its own independent de-
sign through means provided by the parent's generosity. Doran
v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. Law 754, 71 Atl. 296, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
335, 131 Am. St. Rep. 667; Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y.
111, 115 N. E. 443 (1917); Elrick v. Heis, 193 Ala. 669, 69 So.
530 (1915). The child is no more truly the parent's servant under
these circumstances, than is the hired chauffeur who goes on a
"joy-ride" of his own in his master's car. Lotz v. Hanlon, 217
Pa. St. 339, 66 Atl. 525 (1907). Such cases are clearly distinguish-
able from those where the child was operating the car as- the ser-
vant of the parent, e. g., in delivering groceries sold by the parent
in his store, or even where the son takes the family out for their
health or pleasure. Van Baricom v. Dodgson, supra; Smith v.
Jordon, 211 Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 761 (1912); McNeal v. McKain,
33 Okla. 449, 126 Pac. 742 (1912) ; Missell v. Haynes, 83 N. J. Law
554, 91 Atl. 322 (1914). Another reason sometimes given for im-
posing liability is that an automobile is per se a dangerous instru-
mentality, and that, therefore, the parent is necessarily negligent
in intrusting it to a child. Hays v. Hogan, 180 Mo. App. 237, 165
S. W. 1125, 1131 (1914). This contention has usually been over-
ruled, Cohen v. Meador, supra; Premier Mfg. Co. v. Tilford, 111
N. E. 645 (Ind. 1916) ; Smith v. Jordon, supra, but facts may well
exist under which a parent may be negligent in intrusting a car
to a child who is too young, or inexperienced, or reckless, in the
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same manner that parents have been held for intrusting. dangerous
firearms to children. Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky. 926, 62 S. W.
1013, 96 Am. St. Rep. 475, 53 L. R. A. 789 (1901). Cf. Allen v.
Bland, 168 S. W. 35 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) where a parent had
given an automobile to his son, aged 11 years, whose head barely
came above the steering wheel. The court held an automobile not
per se a dangerous instrumentality, but found the boy incompetent
to be intrusted with it. The test is the parent's negligence. In
some jurisdictions there are statutes restricting or forbidding the
operation of automobiles by infants below a certain age. See, for
example, WEST VmGrNIA AcTs, 1917, e. 66, § 127; NEBRASKA RE-
VISED STATUTFS, 1913, e. 28, § 195; NEW YORK CoNsoL. LAWS, c. 25,
§ 282 (2). 'It is clear that a parent's act in permitting a child be-
low the statutory age to operate a car is at least evidence of neg-
ligence by the parent. Walker v. Klopp, 99 Neb. 794, 157 N. W.
962 (1916); Schultz v. Morrison, 154 N. Y. Supp. 257 (1915);
cf. Dickinson v. Stuart Colliery Go., 71 W. Va. 325, 328, 76"S. E.
654 (1912). In the absence of a statute or of evidence that the
daughter was not a fit person to be entrusted with the operation of
an automobile, it would seem clear that the decision in the princi-
pal case is correct since the daughter in operating the car was
acting for her own purposes at the time of the injury. Cases reach-
ing a contrary decision necessarily depart from well-settled prin-
ciples of liability. If a rule of absolute liability is desirable in
such cases, its creation is within the province of the legislature.
See 28 HARV. L. REv. 91; L. R. A. 1916F, 228, note.
PARTNERSHIP-LIABILITY FOR LiEL PuBusm) BY O PART-
NzR.-A partner, while in charge of the firm's correspondence
during the absence of his copartner, wrote to a customer a libelous
letter concerning a transaction with the firm. Held, that the firm
is liable for the publication of the libel. Henry Myers & Co. v.
Lewis, 92 S. E. 988 (Va. 1917).
Although the principal ease appears to be one of first
impression in Virginia as to the liability -of one partner for
a libel published by his copartner, there is ample authority in
accord in other jurisdictions. Lathrop v. Adams, 133 Mass. 471,
43 Am. Rep. 528 (1882) ; Dunn v. Hall, 1 Ind. 344 (1849) ; Bur-
gess & Co. v. Patterson, 32 Ky. Law Rep. 624, 106 S. W. 837
(1908); see RowuLY, MODERN LAW OF PARTR sHIP, § 513. There
is also authority in West Virginia, Citizens' Nat. Bank of
Parkersburg v. Blizzard et al., 93 S. E. 338 (W. Va. 1917),
that one partner may be liable for the tort of his copartner com-
mitted in the conduct of the partnership business. Cases which
seem opposed to the principal case appear to disregard. the ques-
tion whether the service in which the tort was committed, if done
in a proper manner, would have been within the ordinary course
of the partnership affairs and incident to its business, but require
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